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Abstract
This paper contributes to our understanding of managers’ motivations for initiating the sale of their
company. Using a sample of 1,098 publicly-listed US target firms with completed deals, we show
that deals initiated by the target firm rather than by outside bidders have higher CEO ownership.
Furthermore, CEOs are motivated to offer their firms for sale also by higher golden parachutes,
stock and stock option grants prior to takeovers. Our results suggest that motivated CEOs partici-
pate actively in deal negotiations, rather than being bribed not to resist the deal. In target-initiated
deal firms, CEO ownership and equity grants are also positively correlated with takeover premiums.
JEL Classification: G34
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, Deal initiation, Financial constraints, Managerial
motivation
1. Introduction
The extant M&A literature assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that acquisitions are initiated
by potential bidders outside target firms. Indeed, the market for corporate control is built on
the premise of management resistance to takeovers, and that takeovers are initiated by corporate
raiders motivated by future efficiency improvements in target firms (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
Other reasons for mergers and acquisitions, which consider synergies such as economies of scale or
integration, complementarity of resources or diversification, also implicitly assume initiative on the
side of the acquirer (Andrade et al., 2001). However, despite this assumption, a large proportion
of takeovers is initiated by the target firms themselves. For example, Boone and Mulherin (2007)
and Heitzman (2011) report that respectively 15% and 35% of M&A transactions in their samples
were initiated by the target company. In our dataset, which includes relatively small firms, this
proportion is as high as 44%. However, Masulis and Simsir (2015) are as yet alone in analyzing
potential reasons for target firms initiating their own sales.
This paper investigates the motivations of selling-firm managers for initiating the sale of their
firms. By explaining managers’ incentives for target deal initiation, we extend the hypothesis
of financial weaknesses of target-initiated deal firms (Masulis and Simsir, 2015). A firm facing
potential financial distress has few viable alternatives to initiating a takeover that will preserve its
value as a going concern and preempt financial distress costs (Pastena and Ruland, 1986). Without
this key trigger, managers may prefer to remain in control or even strongly resist unsolicited
takeover offers, whereas with the threat of financial distress, managers may prefer a takeover to
bankruptcy. An additional incentive in the form of a managerial ownership stake may increase
the likelihood of a deal initiation by the company because managers with an ownership stake will
benefit from the takeover premium. Therefore, we conjecture that CEO ownership is an important
determinant of the initiation decision.
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Ideally, a decision to initiate a deal under potential financial distress will be taken as a pre-
emptive step before firm’s performance and growth options have deteriorated (Masulis and Simsir,
2015). Although this may be in the best interests of shareholders, managers without ownership
stakes may shy away from such preemptive decisions (Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Eckbo et al.,
2016). As a consequence of a merger, target firm CEOs may need to give up substantial expected
utility from future wages and ability to extract private benefits from the firm (Hartzell et al.,
2004). However, the interests of CEOs with positive ownership stakes are more closely aligned
with shareholders’ interests through their participation in sizable takeover premiums. They may
be motivated to trigger their company sale early, while company performance is still relatively high,
so that growth options are preserved and premiums are higher. In contrast, the trade-off for CEOs
without ownership stakes is tilted toward triggering the company sale later, when financial distress
is inevitable. By triggering the sale later, they keep their in-work benefits for longer. With no
ownership stake, they do not care about the premium being lower. Therefore, we conjecture that
target-initiated deal firms with low CEO ownership exhibit poorer performance and lower growth
options when the sale is initiated.
Our sample of 1,098 publicly-listed US targets with completed deals is drawn from the period
2005 to 2011. It covers 487 target- and 611 bidder-initiated deals. Our results show that firms
with greater managerial ownership are more likely to initiate a deal. They also confirm that
CEO ownership affects the relationship between firm performance (growth options) and target
deal initiation. In line with our conjecture, CEOs without ownership stakes are associated with
a negative effect of firm performance (growth options) on the odds of target initiation, whereas
higher CEO ownership is associated with a positive effect of firm performance on the odds of
target initiation. Moreover, we show that CEO incentives are pivotal. Non-executive ownership
reinforces positive CEO ownership. However, firms without CEO ownership trigger initiation only
when their performance has become quite poor and their growth options are fewer, whether or not
non-executive directors also own a stake.
As a next step, we explore the role of equity grants around the deal initiation, and the role
of golden parachutes. Previous research shows that extra remuneration just before a public deal
announcement is associated with a higher probability of deal completion and compensates CEOs
for earnings and private benefits lost as a result of the merger.1 We conjecture that firms intending
their own sale increase managers’ incentives through additional equity grants, not only once deal
negotiations are under way, but also in expectation of the strategic decision. The key feature of
golden parachutes is that they are triggered only as a result of job termination in transactions
resulting in a successful change in control. Therefore, golden parachutes may be a preferred option
to incentivize managers without ownership stakes. They may be unnecessary for managers with
high ownership stakes. Our analysis confirms the motivational role of equity grants. We also
show that golden parachutes substitute for a lack of CEO ownership in incentivising target deal
initiation.
The last question we address is whether managers are incentivized to participate actively in deal
negotiations, or whether they are simply bribed not to resist the deal. The corporate governance
consequences of the two alternatives are quite different. The latter would suggest overpayment
and opportunism of entrenched managers, while the former would further justify incentives. As a
prior, we favor active CEO participation in takeover negotiations. The intention to sell and the
incentivization of managers for active takeover negotiations are likely to go hand in hand, especially
in cases where managers may be pivotal to deal negotiations. Our results show that the probability
of target deal initiation is higher for firms with higher CEO incentives precisely in informal sales,
when the selling mechanism allows more scope for meaningful negotiations. In contrast, CEO
incentives are not associated with higher odds of target initiation in highly competitive auctions
where the outcomes depend on bidding competition rather than on negotiation skills. Importantly,
1In the period after deal initiation, target CEOs usually get unscheduled option grants (Fich et al., 2011) and
extra cash payments in the form of merger bonuses or increased golden parachutes (Hartzell et al., 2004; Heitzman,
2011; Fich et al., 2013).
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however, we also show that CEO ownership and equity grants in target initiated deals are associated
with higher takeover premiums. Highly motivated managers deliver higher shareholder value.
Our main contribution to the literature is to show that CEO incentives are pivotal to target
deal initiation. CEO ownership increases the odds of firms initiating their own sale. Furthermore,
CEOs with ownership stakes trigger deals preemptively to preserve firm value as a going concern
when financial distress is more likely, and they do so while firm performance and growth options are
still relatively high. Importantly, CEO incentives in target-initiated deal firms are also reflected
in higher takeover premiums. A vital general contribution to the wider M&A literature is to
highlight that publicly-listed firms trigger their own sale relatively frequently, and that their CEOs
have incentives for such decisions. Future research should take this perspective on active takeover
decisions into account, as it is in sharp contrast with the usual premise of imposed disciplinary
takeovers or bidder initiatives (Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). We highlight that
the managerial incentives for target- versus bidder-initiated deals are significantly different.
Our analysis contributes to recent empirical literature that explores deal initiations and their
effect on deal premiums, selling procedures and the probability of deal success (Xie, 2010; Aktas
et al., 2010; Fidrmuc et al., 2012; De Bodt et al., 2014; Masulis and Simsir, 2015). Masulis and
Simsir (2015) argue that acquirers pay lower premiums for target-initiated deals in compensation
for adverse selection. Good-quality target firms generally have strong incentives to avoid selling
themselves at discounted prices, so acquirers infer that target firms initiating deals are more likely
to be overvalued. Xie (2010) links lower premiums for target-initiated deals with both low selling-
firm bargaining power and low bidder valuations. Our analysis shows that high CEO incentives
mitigate the negative impact of target deal initiation on takeover premiums. Although, on average,
target-initiated deals earn lower premiums, ownership stakes and equity grants motivate CEOs
to trigger their takeovers preemptively while associated financial distress costs are low. Takeover
premiums are then higher. Moreover, CEOs with higher incentives are also more likely to negotiate
harder.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the economic intuition
for our five hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data, explains the coding process and method-
ology and provides basic summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 draws
conclusions.
2. Managerial motivation for deal initiation
The main aim of this paper is to deepen our understanding of target managers’ motivations
for initiating M&A deals. The extant literature provides several reasons why firms might be
taken over, relating to corporate governance, industry dynamics, firm asset characteristics and
financial constraints,2 but provides few arguments for why firms might initiate their own sale.
Masulis and Simsir (2015) have recently suggested that financial and competitive weaknesses lead
firms to initiate M&A deals. They also argue that adverse selection effects result in initiation
being associated with negative signals about firm prospects and valuation. The financial weakness
explanation for target deal initiation builds on Shrieves and Stevens (1979) bankruptcy avoidance
rationale for takeovers, arguing that a firm may prefer to be sold as a going concern rather than
as a fire sale in order to preserve value and resolve uncertainty faster. Pastena and Ruland (1986)
suggest that, from shareholders’ perspective, distressed firms should take the initiative in trying to
arrange a merger in preference to bankruptcy.3 This is because target shareholders have incentives
to consider an acquisition well before the firm shows any evidence of financial distress (Masulis and
Simsir, 2015). Right timing is important for the preservation of firm value, and firm insiders have
2See, for example, Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Hoberg and
Phillips (2010), Almeida et al. (2011), Edmans et al. (2012), Bena and Li (2014), Khatami et al. (2014), Erel et al.
(2015) and Jenter and Lewellen (2015).
3Pastena and Ruland (1986) were unable to confirm their conjecture empirically as data on deal initiations was
unavailable at the time of their study.
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more information than potential bidders about the urgency of a situation and the suitability of a
sale.
Pastena and Ruland (1986) also point out that managers without ownership stakes may shy
away from initiating a takeover for fear of losing their jobs. They prefer the chance to stay in
control for longer and enjoy their private benefits. Therefore, our first conjecture is that firms are
more likely to initiate their own sale if they have high managerial ownership. Ownership stakes
align managers’ and shareholders’ interests through managers participating in takeover premiums.
Target managers with ownership stakes have additional financial incentives to sell their firm pre-
emptively when the odds of financial distress increase but bankruptcy is not yet imminent, while
the firm still has value as a going concern (Shrieves and Stevens, 1979). Moreover, by actively
initiating a takeover, managers with ownership stakes remain in control and may influence the
choice of bidder and overall outcomes, such as offer price, method of payment and perhaps future
employment with the merged entity. In contrast, managers of financially distressed firms that file
for bankruptcy or restructure their debt are at high risk of losing their jobs and earning signifi-
cantly less in the future (Gilson, 1989; Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993; Eckbo et al., 2016). Managers
without ownership stakes, however, will want to postpone a deal initiation somewhat longer. They
will not be compensated for loss of employment benefits through participating in the takeover
premium. Therefore, their trade-off is tilted toward keeping their employment benefits for longer.
They opt for deal initiation only when financial distress becomes inevitable, by which time firm
performance is poorer and growth options fewer.
Other alternatives to initiating a company sale in the case of financial distress may involve
a disciplinary CEO replacement or some form of investor activism, often associated with a de-
crease in CEO pay, CEO departure, or a takeover (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). Both
CEO replacement and investor activism are highly correlated with poor stock and accounting
performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Weisbach, 1988; Greenwood and Schor, 2009), and,
therefore, would be more applicable to target-initiation situations, where there are low managerial
ownership stakes.4 In comparing available alternatives, managers will prefer a company sale be-
cause leaving their company due to a change in control has less negative impact on their wealth
and future employment prospects than forced turnover (Hartzell et al., 2004). Moreover, guiding
their firm through a successful friendly acquisition may provide them with valuable experience that
enhances their future job prospects (Harford and Schonlau, 2013).
We summarize our conjectures so far in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: CEO ownership increases the probability of target versus bidder deal initiation.
Hypothesis 1b: CEO ownership affects the link between firm performance (growth options) and
target deal initiation. CEOs with higher ownership stakes are motivated to trigger their
company sale sooner when firm performance (growth options) is (are) still relatively high.
It is important to note that the board of directors is ultimately responsible for deciding on
important strategic alternatives, including a company sale. Therefore, ownership stakes by non-
executive directors and their relationship with executives may also affect the initiation decision.
High ownership by non-executive directors may reinforce our conjectured association between firm
performance and the initiation decision (Hypothesis 1b). In other words, high ownership stakes by
non-executive directors may additionally motivate preemptive deal initiation, and, will therefore
be associated with better target-firm stock and accounting performance and higher growth options
in target-initiated deal firms. However, in target firms without non-executive ownership, CEO
trade-offs dominate the initiation decision, as control in such cases is very likely to be held by
CEOs. Furthermore, we note that independent non-executive directors without ownership stakes
lack direct motivation to push through a timely sale. Therefore, board independence, as opposed to
non-executive ownership, is unlikely to produce a similar reinforcing effect. In short, we formulate
the following hypothesis:
4Managers with high ownership stakes will prefer to preempt deterioration of firm performance and value.
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Hypothesis 2: Non-executive director ownership reinforces the performance effect of CEO own-
ership.
Our first hypothesis stipulates that managerial ownership is positively associated with target
deal initiation. However, we should also consider the role of equity grants before and after the
initiation decision, and the role of golden parachutes in deal initiation. Hartzell et al. (2004) and
Fich et al. (2011) explore ways of motivating target managers in all deals, regardless of initiation, to
cooperate once the target firm is ‘in play.’ We argue that motivating managers is more important in
the case of a target-initiated deal, and then also in the period before deal negotiations have actually
started. In particular, we conjecture that in order to motivate managers for a takeover deal, target
initiated deal firms award their managers more stocks and stock options both before and during
the negotiation process. Increased ownership stakes align managers’ interests with those of the
firm’s shareholders. As a result of the takeover, managers are still likely to lose the value of their
remuneration and private benefits associated with controlling and running the target firm. With
higher ownership stakes, they share in gains from takeover premiums, so their trade-off is tilted
toward initiation. Equity grants fine-tune the incentive effect when CEO ownership is already in
place.
Golden parachutes are an alternative tool that may motivate managers to accept takeover
offers (Hartzell et al., 2004). With low managerial ownership, golden parachutes may compensate
managers for lost salary and other perquisites. However, unlike equity grants, they are payable only
in the case of a change in control. This makes them cheaper, and hence relatively attractive. Golden
parachutes are perhaps unnecessary in the case of high managerial ownership, when managers are
already incentivized for the sale by their prospective participation in takeover premiums. Thus,
we conjecture that golden parachutes serve as an alternative incentive for deal initiation that
substitutes in a lump sum for the motivational role of high managerial share ownership. The
following hypotheses summarize our conjectures:
Hypothesis 3a: Golden parachutes serve as a substitute deal initiation incentive tool that pro-
vides CEO incentives when CEO ownership is low.
Hypothesis 3b: Target-initiated deal firms increase their CEOs’ equity grants before and just
after initiation of the sale.
So far we have considered managerial attitudes toward takeover initiation per se. Nevertheless,
it is important to distinguish whether managers are motivated simply not to resist takeovers, or
are actually incentivized for active participation in deal negotiations. In the former case, managers
are plainly bribed not to resist the takeover, and the money they receive is not directly associated
with any value they create. In the latter case, however, if managers participate actively in deal
negotiations, with extra effort they may directly improve the deal offer.
In order to distinguish managerial motivation for takeover initiation in the form of active par-
ticipation in deal negotiations from plain bribing for low deal resistance, we exploit procedural
differences between formal full-scale auctions from less formal sales. Full-scale auctions are a very
formalized, pre-determined and fixed way to sell firms (Hansen, 2001). They allow the selling com-
pany to commit credibly to executing the merger and maximize bidding competition. However,
high bidding competition decreases the probability of winning for each potential bidder; therefore,
it discourages more thorough and costly involvement and due diligence by each individual bidder
in the bidding process. Consequently, it discourages more aggressive bidding behavior. Boone and
Mulherin (2009) argue that restricting competition in controlled sales or one-to-one negotiations
(we treat these together as informal sales) may bring the advantage that remaining bidders are
willing to bid more aggressively and, in general, become more involved in and spend more resources
on the sale process. With restricted competition, bidders are confident that their own offer will not
be trumped by that of uninformed bidders, who would bid high only by chance rather than because
they value the target highly. Moreover, Boone and Mulherin (2009) argue that this ‘managed’ sales
process resembles book-building in IPOs and involves a two-way exchange of information between
sellers and potential bidders. Thus, informal sales provide space for useful information flow and
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negotiation.5 CEOs with ownership stakes can participate actively in the negotiations and deliver
sizeable takeover premiums. In contrast, formal full-scale auctions emphasize competition rather
than negotiation skills as the main mechanism to capture value created in deals. Therefore, man-
agerial ownership stakes are unlikely to play the same role in full-scale auctions as in informal sales.
To summarize, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: CEOs with ownership stakes are motivated for active participation in deal ne-
gotiations. As a result, the positive relationship between CEO ownership and target deal
initiation is present in informal sales but not in full-scale auctions.
In addition, active participation of managers in deal negotiations may naturally lead to higher
takeover premiums. If we correctly conjecture that managers with higher ownership stakes are mo-
tivated for active participation in deal negotiations, we should see that higher managerial ownership
in target-initiated deals is also associated with higher takeover premiums. A higher correlation be-
tween target initiation, CEO ownership and premiums in informal sales would also reinforce our
sales mechanism argument above. Thus, our last hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5: CEO ownership in target-initiated deals is positively associated with takeover
premiums. This effect is stronger in informal sales than in full-scale auctions.
3. Data
Our sample includes US M&A deals announced between January 2005 and December 2011,
which are covered by the Security Database Corporation (SDC) in Thomson ONE Banker. We
apply the following three selection criteria: (i) both acquirer and target are US companies; (ii) all
targets are publicly-listed firms before the deal, while acquirers may be publicly-listed or private
firms; (iii) acquirers own 100% of targets’ shares after the deal. We use COMPUSTAT (annual
updates) and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to collect accounting and stock price
data, respectively. Institutional ownership data come from FactSet, and insider ownership and stock
and stock option grants data are drawn from Thomson Insider Filings. Corporate governance data
and CEO characteristics are taken from a combination of ExecuComp, ISS Governance Services
(formerly Risk-Metrics), Thomson Reuters Eikon and hand collection from SEC EDGAR company
filings. Hand collection is necessary for small firms. Industry composition data are collected from
the Hoberg-Phillips Data Library. Appendix A provides detailed information on data sources for
each variable.
We also hand collect and code information concerning the selling process from the ‘background
of the deal’ section of DEFM14A, PREM14A, SC14D9 and S-4 filings, which we recover from the
EGDAR filing collection provided by the SEC.6 We hand collect information concerning initiation,
initiation date, selling mechanism, number of bidders contacted and the number of bidders signing
a confidentiality agreement. Appendix B illustrates our coding system on examples of a target-
initiated deal (between Applebees International Inc., the target, and IHOP Corp., the acquirer)
and a bidder-initiated deal (between AirTran Holdings Inc., the target, and Southwest Airlines Co.,
the acquirer).
3.1. The selling process
The sale of a company is usually initiated either by the board of the company deciding that
they want to be sold or by a prospective bidder proposing to take over the firm. We code the
5We do not have any direct way of confirming our conjecture that informal sales are associated with more space for
managers’ active participation in deal negotiations. Nevertheless, we have information on CEOs securing positions
in merged firms for at least two years after completion of the deal. Supporting the conjecture of higher involvement
of managers in takeover negotiations, CEOs of target-initiated deals manage to secure jobs with the merged company
significantly more often in informal sales (15.9%) than in formal auctions (10.1%). The difference is significant at
the 10% level.
6These SEC filings are mostly available only for completed deals; consequently, we decide not to cover withdrawn
or canceled deals.
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initiation decision based on actions by targets or bidders as described in the SEC filings. Usually,
if a target firm plans to sell, the board considers various ‘strategic alternatives’ that include a
possible sale of the company, and hire a financial advisor to evaluate these strategic alternatives.
We classify a deal as target-initiated if the target company firmly decides on a sale, or at least hires
a financial advisor to identify and contact potential bidders. We classify a deal as bidder-initiated
when a buyer approaches the target firm with a takeover proposal, and the board considers the
proposal and responds to the bidder. The target firm may then negotiate with the first bidder or
contact other potential bidders to encourage wider competition. Whether the deal is initiated by
the final acquirer or by another bidder, we define such deals as bidder-initiated. Over the period
2005-2011, of 2,003 completed deals identified in SDC we are able to find SEC filings on EDGAR
for 1,260 deals. For 103 deals, we are unable to classify the initiator, and for further 59 targets, we
are unable to obtain data from COMPUSTAT or CRSP. Altogether, our hand collection results in
a sample of 1,098 deals, of which 487 are target-initiated and 611 are bidder-initiated.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the selling process for target- versus bidder-initiated deals.
Definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A. We test for differences in means using the t-test
allowing for unequal variances and for differences in medians using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
rank sum test. Target-initiated deals are significantly smaller (USD1.4 billion) than bidder-initiated
deals (USD2.2 billion). In line with the literature (Masulis and Simsir, 2015; Fidrmuc et al., 2012)
we find that target-initiated deals earn smaller premiums (27% versus 39%). Thirty-nine percent
of all deals initiated by a potential bidder are eventually acquired by a different bidder.
- insert Table 1 about here -
Firms may be sold through full-scale auctions, controlled sales or private negotiations (Boone
and Mulherin, 2009). A full-scale auction is a very structured process that follows multiple designed
rounds and accommodates a relatively large number of bidders (Hansen, 2001). Controlled sales also
involve competitive bidding, but from a limited number of bidders. In controlled sales, target firms
canvas interest from a chosen number of bidders who then counter-bid against each other (Boone
and Mulherin, 2009). Private negotiations involve only one bidder. Compared with bidder-initiated
deals, target-initiated deals are more frequently sold in auctions (50% versus 20%, respectively)
and less often sold through private negotiations (14% versus 42%, respectively). These statistics
are consistent with Xie (2010).
The initiation date is the date when a company starts to consider a potential sale of its business
(Boone and Mulherin, 2007). For target-initiated deals, it is usually the date when the board of
directors decides that it wants to explore strategic alternatives. For bidder-initiated deals, the
initiation date is established by a potential buyer directly expressing interest in buying the target
firm. Table 1 shows that target-initiated deals take on average longer from initiation date to
completion (595 versus 441 days), although they take fewer days between public announcement
and completion. This is the case regardless of the selling mechanism.7 Since the private selling
process is relatively lengthy, and because of the difference in length between target- versus bidder-
initiated deals, it is important to measure all firm characteristics that affect the initiation decision
prior to the initiation date. Measuring firm characteristics at the announcement date may result
in significant biases to key variables in our analysis.8 For example, the difference in stock and
accounting performance between the two types of target firms is smaller before the initiation date
than it is just before the announcement date because it improves more in the meantime for bidder-
initiated deal firms. The difference in leverage between the two groups is larger before initiation
because target-initiated deal firms decrease their leverage more. Finally, R&D expenses decrease
more for target-initiated deal firms, which means that the difference is larger before initiation than
before the announcement.
7These statistics are not reported, but are available on request.
8Masulis and Simsir (2015) measure their firm characteristics at the SDC announcement date and so might be
subject to this bias.
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We also code the number of potential bidders that a target firm contacts during the selling
process and the number of bidders with which a target firm signs a confidentiality agreement. The
average number of bidders contacted (30 versus 9) and signing a confidentiality agreement (11
versus 4) is significantly higher for target-initiated deals. This is also the case when we control for
the selling process. Bidder-initiated deals are more often bought by public acquirers (71% versus
65%). The payment consideration does not differ between the two groups. The majority of deals
are paid for in cash (68% and 71%).
3.2. Methodology and matching
The main aim of the paper is to analyze determinants of the initiation decision, which may
be estimated as a model with a binary dependent variable, setting the dependent variable to one
for all target-initiated deals and zero for bidder-initiated deals. However, this standard regression
technique may deliver inconsistent estimators if unobserved factors that affect the response (in our
case, the type of deal initiation) are correlated with unobserved factors that affect the selection of
the variable (Heckman, 1979). In fact, the type of deal initiation is observed only when a firm goes
through a takeover. If unobserved factors affect both the odds of target initiation and the odds of
takeovers in general (and thus the selection process), the coefficient estimates of a standard logit
may be biased. To address this problem, we estimate a probit model with a selection treatment
(Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006) that involves a system of two equations. The deal initiation
decision represents the second stage. To control for possible selection bias, the first stage of the
system models the odds of takeover, with the dependent variable equal to one for all target firms
and zero for firms not involved in any takeover deal and remaining publicly listed. In order to
estimate the first stage of the system concerning determinants of the takeover odds, we match each
of our target firms with a firm that remains publicly listed.
Size is a very important matching requirement because it strongly affects the odds of becoming
a takeover target. Small firms are more likely to be taken over (Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Meggin-
son, 1992; Cornett et al., 2011). The costs of absorbing a large firm into the acquirer’s business or
of a hostile takeover of a large firm are prohibitive. Moreover, size is usually correlated with other
determinants, such as corporate governance, insider ownership and innovation, so it is important to
compare small target firms with firms of similar size that remain publicly listed. Industry affiliation
is also important for matching (Palepu, 1986). Therefore, our matching procedure is as follows.
From the pool of all potential matching firms with available accounting and stock price data, we
pick the firm that is in the same Fama-French 30 industry and is closest in terms of total assets
in the same fiscal year using a +/–25% range. If we fail to find a matching firm, we repeat the
process for the corresponding Fama-French 12 industry. If we still do not have a match, we apply
the 4-digit SIC-code industry and then the 3-digit, 2-digit and finally 1-digit SIC-code industry.
We also require that the same publicly-listed firm is not matched repeatedly with different target
firms, and that target firms that drop out of our dataset due to unavailable SEC filing data are
not included as matched firms.9
Panel A of Table 2, showing means for total assets, total sales, market capitalization and firm
age, confirms insignificant size differences between deal and matched firms (Columns 5 and 6, with
differences shown in Column 7). However, deal firms are significantly less valuable and younger
than matched firms. Checking differences within the group of deal firms in Columns 2 and 3 (with
differences shown in Column 4) reveals that target-initiated deal firms are smaller and less valuable
than bidder-initiated deal firms. The difference in age is not significant.
- insert Table 2 about here -
An alternative to matching would be to include the population of all publicly-listed firms without
takeover announcements. However, CEO and corporate governance characteristics are not available
9Altogether, 889 target firms are matched based on FF30 industry, 162 based on FF12, 28 based on 4-digit SIC,
2 based on 3-digit SIC, 7 based on 2-digit SIC and finally 10 targets based on 1-digit SIC.
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in electronic datasets for smaller firms, as ISS Governance Services (formerly Risk-Metrics) covers
only S&P 1500 firms, meaning that only around 15% of our target and matched firms are available
electronically. Moreover, as target deal initiation is tilted toward smaller firms (see Table 1), it is
important to keep as many small firms in the dataset as possible to avoid any unnecessary biases.
To avoid time-consuming hand-collection of data, we create our counterfactual by matching each
deal firm based on firm size (total assets) and target industry just before each deal initiation, and
we hand collect data from Thomson Reuters Eikon and SEC EDGAR filings for small matched
firms. Our decision is supported by Palepu (1986), who argues that any analysis based on matched
samples should result in the right relative ranking of firms in terms of their acquisition probabilities.
As we are not interested in forecasting the odds of takeover out of sample per se, our conclusions
based on relative ranks of the outcomes are unlikely to lead to erroneous inferences, even when
based on matched counterfactuals as opposed to a random (or full) sample.
To properly identify a system with a selection treatment, we need to choose an appropriate
exclusion restriction that determines the odds of takeover in the first stage, but is not directly
associated with the initiation choice in the second stage, only indirectly in terms of the takeover
odds. Firm age fits the role very well – younger firms are naturally more prone to be taken over
because they are usually more innovative (Bena and Li, 2014; Phillips and Zhdanov, 2013) and have
higher growth options, but suffer from financial constraints (Palepu, 1986; Whited and Wu, 2006;
Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). Nevertheless, in line with valid exclusion restriction requirements, all
possible arguments for association between firm age and target deal initiation (such as innovation,
growth prospects and financial constraints) feed through increased odds of takeover in general
rather than through a direct path. For example, one might argue that young innovative firms are
associated with increased odds of target initiation because they have many profitable projects but
lack the resources to execute them. However, one might also argue that young innovative firms are
very attractive targets for bidder-initiated deals. Therefore, it appears that firm age affects target
initiation only indirectly, not directly, by increasing the odds of takeover in general. The last row
in Panel A of Table 2 confirms the strong association between firm age and the odds of takeover
(Column 5 versus 6). At the same time, firm age is not significantly different for target- versus
bidder-initiated deals (Columns 2 and 3).
To be on the safe side, we add another exclusion restriction – industry M&A activity. The
argument for its suitability as an exclusion restriction is similar to the argument for firm age.
The literature provides strong evidence that industry M&A activity affects the odds of takeovers
(Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Schingemann et al., 2002). However, it is difficult to come up with
reasons why any industry disturbances should directly affect target rather than bidder initiation,
or vice versa. A more active M&A market in a given industry may motivate target firms to put
themselves up for sale because in buoyant markets they will be more likely to attract buyers.
However, in buoyant markets, bidders are also more likely to approach prospective targets of their
choice. High M&A activity seems to increase the odds of both target- and bidder-initiated deals,
and is therefore correlated with target initiation only indirectly through higher takeover odds. The
last row in Table 2 (Panel D) confirms that M&A activity is not significantly different for target-
versus bidder-initiated deal firms (Columns 2 and 3), while all deal firms together (Column 5)
experience periods of significantly higher M&A activity than non-deal firms (Column 6).
3.3. Univariate statistics
The existing literature suggests several potential candidates associated with the likelihood of a
successful takeover deal in the first stage of our probit model with selection treatment. We group
all determinants of takeovers into three categories. First, Jenter and Lewellen (2015) suggest that
CEO age and corporate governance characteristics affect the likelihood of takeovers. Ownership and
takeover defense characteristics, suggested by Ambrose and Megginson (1992), are also related, and
are the main focus of our study with respect to deal initiation. Second, in line with our hypothesis
development, we consider increased odds of financial distress measured in terms of leverage and
interest coverage. To ensure that we pick up the effect of potential financial distress as conjectured,
we also control for financial constraints (Erel et al., 2015; Khatami et al., 2014; Almeida et al.,
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2011) and imminent financial distress measured by the Z-score (Altman, 1968). The third group of
factors focuses on target-firm stock and operating performance and asset characteristics (Palepu,
1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Edmans et al., 2012; Bena and Li, 2014). This group should
allow us to test Hypothesis 1b concerning the differential effect of managerial ownership on the
relationship between firm performance (or growth options) and target deal initiation.
Panel B of Table 2 lists the first set of characteristics concerning ownership structure, corporate
governance and CEO age. For all variables, we show their means across target- versus bidder-
initiated deal firms (Columns 2 and 3, respectively). The differences in and statistical significance
of the two means follows (Column 4). To complete the picture, we also report means of the variables
for all deal firms together (Column 5) and for their matched firms (Column 6). The difference in
means between deal and matched firms is reported in Column 7. Column 1 shows the number of
available observations. All variables are measured just before the initiation date and are winsorized
at 1% and 99%.
Panel B shows that target-initiated deal firms exhibit significantly higher CEO, executive and
non-executive ownership, translating into higher insider ownership by all officers and directors to-
gether. At the same time, target-initiated deal firms exhibit lower institutional ownership. CEOs
in target-initiated deal firms also receive higher equity grants both before and after the deal initia-
tion date, but not after public announcement of the deal. Target-initiated deals have lower board
independence, probably because of low institutional ownership. They are also more likely to have
CEOs of retirement age. These differences between target- versus bidder-initiated firms translate
mainly into significant differences between deal and matched firms. In addition, deal firms have
larger boards and higher takeover defences as defined by Bebchuk et al. (2002).
Panel C focuses on financial distress and financial constraints. We see significant differences
both between target- and bidder-initiated deal firms, and also between deal and non-deal firms.
Target-initiated deal firms suffer higher financial distress signs – they exhibit higher leverage and
net leverage, and lower interest coverage ratio. We also estimate abnormal net leverage, which
should indicate deviations from optimal leverage given firm characteristics.10 We confirm that
target-initiated deal firms suffer significant excess leverage. They also have significantly higher
SA indeces, indicating higher financial constraints, and are more likely to fall into the financial
distress category with low Z-score. They issue more equity. The asset characteristics shown in
Panel D suggest that differences between target- and bidder-initiated deals stem from higher R&D
and lower profitability of target-initiated deals. The deal firms together are quite different from
non-deal firms: they have lower stock performance, market-to-book ratios and asset tangibility,
but higher R&D ratios. They also operate in less concentrated industries and industries with less
similarity (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016).
4. Results
4.1. CEO ownership
Table 3 shows regression results from testing Hypothesis 1a, that higher managerial ownership
increases the odds of target versus bidder deal initiation. Panel A focuses solely on the effect of
ownership and corporate governance variables, while Panel B shows results in line with the financial
weakness hypothesis (Masulis and Simsir, 2015). Panel C pools together all explanatory variables.
For each specification, we report estimated coefficients for (i) a standard logit model (1st column),
limited to all target firms, with the dependent variable equal to one for all target-initiated deals and
zero for bidder-initiated deals; and (ii) a probit model with selection treatment, which represents a
system modeling not only the target initiation decision (the second stage, 2nd column), but also the
odds of takeover in general to control for selection issues (the first stage, 3rd column). M&A activity
10Using all firms available on COMPUSTAT from 1950 to 2015, we estimate a simple net leverage model following
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and then use the error terms of the model for our deal firms as a proxy for deviations
from the optimal leverage level. The estimated model is described in the optimal leverage entry in Appendix A.
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and firm age serve as exclusion restriction variables in the first stage of the probit model.11 For all
specifications, we report Hubert/White robust standard errors in parentheses and include time and
industry dummies.12 It is important to note that, for all specifications, the second-stage selection
model estimates (2nd column) hardly differ at all from estimates of the corresponding standard
logit model (1st column). Importantly, the correlation between residuals of the two stages of the
model with selection treatment, reported at the bottom of each specification, is not significantly
different from zero, which means that the second stage of target initiation may be considered as
independent and we obtain unbiased estimates with standard logistic models.
Table 3 reveals that several factors significantly determine the odds of becoming a takeover tar-
get in the first stage of the treatment system (3rd column), while only a few variables are significant
in predicting the odds of target initiation in the second stage (2nd column) or the standard logit
(1st column). This shows that the deal firms are quite alike in terms of target- or bidder-initiated
deals, but they differ quite significantly and in important ways from non-acquired firms. Deal
firms, as a group, tend to have CEOs of retirement age and large monitoring block holders and
are younger, with less independent and larger boards. Good stock performance decreases the odds
of becoming a successful takeover target, while good operating performance increases the odds.
The takeover targets also appear to be more likely to have acquired other firms, divested assets
and issued new equity or debt in the recent past. They operate in industries with higher takeover
activity.
Focusing on differences between target- and bidder-initiated deal firms (Panel A of Table 3),
we confirm Hypothesis 1a: higher CEO ownership increases the odds of target deal initiation.
Specifications 1 and 2 show that the coefficient for CEO ownership is significantly positive at the
1% level, whether or not we include all corporate governance variables. In contrast, ownership
by non-executive directors is not significant, even when included separately in Specification 3.
However, in Specification 4, insider ownership by all officers and directors significantly increases
the odds of target initiation. CEO ownership also remains significant in Panel C with all factors
regressed together. Overall, we see that CEO ownership is a very important determinant of target
deal initiation, while other corporate governance variables do not affect the initiation decision.13
- insert Table 3 about here -
Panel B shows the second set of significant factors for deal initiation, concerning potential
financial distress and asset characteristics, as also suggested by Masulis and Simsir (2015). The
first specification shows that higher leverage increases the odds of target initiation.14 Interestingly,
the SA index measuring financial constraints (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) does not diminish the
significance of leverage and by itself is not significant, even though it dominates the takeover odds
in the first stage of the system with selection treatment (3rd column). This result suggests that
high leverage per se rather than financial constraint increases the odds of target deal initiation: a
firm must face increased prospects of financial distress to be motivated to organize its own sale.
A financing shock that triggers binding financial constraints but leads only to postponement of
investments does not tend to push firms into deal initiation. Specifications 2 to 4 replace leverage
with abnormal net leverage. The idea is that target-initiated deal firms should be not just leveraged,
but over-leveraged. In line with this argument, abnormal net leverage measures the deviation of
observed net leverage from its optimal level, where optimal net leverage is estimated, following
Rajan and Zingales (1995), as the fitted value of a simple net leverage model, using all firms
11For discussion of the probit with selection treatment see Section 3.2.
12To preserve space, we do not report the industry and time effects in the table.
13In unreported regressions, we also explore the role of CEO tenure. One might argue that long tenure with a
company might substitute for the motivational role of CEO ownership. Our analysis shows that the number of years
in the job at the time of deal initiation does not affect the target deal initiation decision; nor does CEO tenure alter
the other estimated coefficients. However, CEO tenure becomes positively significant when interacted with CEO
ownership. CEOs with higher ownership stakes are even more likely to initiate their company sale when they have
longer tenure.
14Replacing leverage with net leverage or interest coverage does not change the conclusion.
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available on COMPUSTAT from 1950 to 2015.15 We see that the odds of target deal initiation are
increased for firms with higher abnormal net leverage. Leverage and abnormal net leverage also
remain the key statistically significant variables in Panel C with all variables together.
Specification 4 in Panel B controls for imminent financial distress as it includes two dummy
variables for low and high Altman’s Z-scores (Altman, 1968). Both Z-score dummies are insignifi-
cant, suggesting that target-initiated deal firms are neither financially distressed nor very healthy.
This result is quite important: although high leverage in target-initiated deal firms suggests in-
creased possibility of financial distress, financial distress is not yet imminent. Specification 4 in
Panel B also includes dummies for debt and equity issues over the three years prior to the deal
initiation. The debt issue dummy is not significant, but the positive and significant coefficient
for equity issues shows that target-initiated deal firms do try to dilute their leverage before orga-
nizing the acquisition. We also check for alternative strategies that may help to avoid the firm
sale, such as asset sales or acquisitions of other firms. Neither the asset-sale nor acquirer dummy
variables are statistically significant.16 Panel B also shows that target-initiated deal firms have
lower accounting performance but do not suffer from low stock performance.17 We see some signs
of better future prospects and growth options for target-initiated deal firms. R&D expenses and
the long-run value-to-book component of the market-to-book ratio, following Rhodes-Kropf et al.
(2005), are significant in Specifications 2 and 3, although their significance drops in Panel C with
all variables regressed together.
Hypothesis 1b explores the relationship between firm performance (growth options) and target
deal initiation through the effect of CEO ownership. In particular, Hypothesis 1b conjectures that
managers with higher ownership stakes are motivated to trigger deal initiation while their firm’s
stock and accounting performance is still relatively good. However, managers without ownership
stakes wait longer and trigger deal initiation only once financial distress is more imminent; thus,
firm performance and growth options are poorer. In order to test this conjecture, we devide the
group of target-initiated deal firms into firms with positive versus zero CEO ownership and contrast
the two groups with all bidder-initiated deal firms. We are interested in the differential impact of
stock and accounting performance and asset intangibility on target deal initiation across the two
CEO ownership groups. Accordingly, Panel A in Table 4 shows the logistic regression results for
the first group with positive CEO ownership stakes in Columns 1 to 5, and for the second group
with zero CEO ownership stakes in Columns 6 to 10.18
- insert Table 4 about here -
Panel A confirms Hypothesis 1b: we see that past returns significantly increase the odds of
target initiation for CEOs with ownership stakes, but significantly decrease the odds when CEOs
do not own any shares in the target company. Operational income before interest expenses and
depreciation is again significantly negative for target-initiated deal firms without CEO ownership
stakes, but insignificant for those with CEO ownership stakes. Finally, asset intangibility, measured
as long-run value-to-book, R&D ratio or asset tangibility, is significant for target-initiated deal firms
with CEO ownership stakes, but insignificant when CEOs do not own any shares.
Panels B and C of Table 4 test Hypothesis 2, that non-executive director ownership rein-
forces the CEO ownership effect documented in Panel A. In Panel B, we take all target-initiated
deal firms with positive CEO ownership stakes and further condition on non-executive ownership.
Columns 1 to 5 contrast target-initiated deal firms that have positive CEO ownership and positive
non-executive ownership with all bidder-initiated deal firms. Columns 6 to 10, in turn, contrast
15The estimated model is described in the optimal leverage entry in Appendix A.
16It is perhaps important to note that both the target- and bidder-initiated deal firms actively participate in asset
sales and in acquisitions of other firms over the three years prior to initiation of the current deal, as shown in the
first stage of the selection system in the 3rd column.
17Unreported specifications also confirm that changing EBITDA to net income, or raw stock returns to abnormal
returns adjusted for equally-weighted market return does not change the conclusions.
18Although, to preserve space, we do not report the selection models in this table, we do check and confirm that
selection issues do not affect our coefficient estimates.
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target-initiated deal firms that have positive CEO ownership but zero non-executive ownership with
all bidder-initiated deal firms. The former five columns show better stock performance and higher
growth options than the latter. We see that non-executive director ownership reinforces CEO moti-
vation for preemptive target deal initiation: performance and growth options are higher when both
CEOs and non-executive directors own company shares. Panel C conditions on zero CEO ownership
in combination with positive (Columns 1-5) and zero (Columns 6-10) non-executive ownership. The
two groups of target-initiated deal firms are again contrasted with all bidder-initiated deal firms.
Now we see that, in contrast to our conjecture, positive non-executive ownership does not altogether
substitute for CEO incentives: performance is quite poor, regardless of non-executive ownership
stake. In summary, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported, as non-executive ownership reinforces
positive CEO ownership but does not substitute for a lack of CEO ownership.
4.2. Equity grants and golden parachutes
The first two columns in Table 5 test Hypothesis 3a: they explore how CEO golden parachutes
in place before deal initiation affect who initiates the deal.19 Column 1 shows that although CEO
ownership is associated with higher odds of deal initiation, golden parachutes are not. Following
Powers (2005), at the bottom of the table we also report the marginal effects of CEO ownership and
golden parachutes on the probability of target deal initiation. We see that a change from zero to
positive CEO stake increases the probability of target initiation by 7%. This effect is significant at
the 5% level. The effect is also economically significant, given that the overall probability of target
deal initiation is 44%. The marginal effect of golden parachutes is positive, small and insignificant.
However, Column 2, with an interaction term between the golden-parachute dummy and CEO-
ownership dummy, shows that golden parachutes do not matter for deal initiation in firms with
higher CEO ownership, but significantly increase the probability of target deal initiation in firms
without CEO ownership. Again following Powers (2005), we report the marginal effects on the
probability of target deal initiation at the bottom of the table.20 We see that the average marginal
effects of CEO ownership and golden parachutes do not change with the inclusion of their interaction
term. However, we are interested in the conditional marginal effects of golden parachutes, given
positive versus zero CEO ownership, which are reported below the average effects. We see that
changing golden parachutes from zero to one when CEO ownership is zero increases the probability
of target deal initiation by 9%. In contrast, the same change when CEO ownership is positive
results in an insignificant change in target initiation probability. These results suggest that golden
parachutes and CEO ownership are substitutes. CEOs receive golden parachutes to motivate them
to initiate a deal when they do not own shares.
- insert Table 5 about here -
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 5 test Hypothesis 3b: they explore grants of stocks and stock options
to CEOs over the period from two years before the initiation up to deal completion. Hypothesis
3b conjectures that if a board of directors perceives a future takeover deal to be more likely, it
will grant its CEO extra stocks and stock options in order to align CEO and shareholder interests.
Column 3 shows that equity grants are significantly higher in target-initiated deals. The average
marginal effect indicates that a one standard deviation change in equity grants (2.3%) results in a
4.6% increase in probability of target initiation. Column 4 includes all interaction terms between
equity grants, CEO ownership and golden parachutes and shows that equity grants are higher
when CEO ownership is positive. The marginal effect of equity grants conditional on positive CEO
ownership is significant at the 5% level, while the marginal effect of equity grants conditional on
zero CEO ownership is insignificant. The marginal effects of equity grants conditional on a lack
19Again, as above, the selection issues do not exhibit any significant effect on the coefficient estimates. Although
we run a sample selection model for each specification, to spare space, we report only standard logistic regressions
coefficient estimates.
20Powers (2005) shows that relying on the interaction term may lead to false conclusions concerning the probability
rather than the odds of the outcome variable.
13
versus presence of golden parachutes are both significant and their difference is not statistically
significant. Golden parachutes do not change the effect of equity grants.
In Column 5, we divide all equity grants into (i) equity grants two years before the deal initiation,
(ii) equity grants from initiation up to the deal announcement, and (iii) equity grants after the
public announcement up to deal completion. Table 2 with summary statistics shows that target
firm CEO ownership increases, on average, by 0.8% as a result of equity grants during the two
years before initiation, and increases by 0.3% due to equity grants between takeover initiation and
announcement, but increases by only 0.1% following equity grants after the deal announcement. In
the regression in Column 5, only the second coefficient for stock and stock option grants after deal
initiation but before public announcement is significant. In order to preserve space in the table, we
report only the second coefficient (under the heading ‘Equity grants’) and leave the two insignificant
coefficients unreported. Target-initiated deal firms do not grant their CEOs more stocks and stock
options before the deal initiation, but they do grant them more equity-based compensation after
the selling process has started. This result might indicate bribing of CEOs to accept the deal. We
further explore the issue in Section 4.3, where we divide the sample between auctions and informal
sales. Further unreported regressions with interaction terms for equity grants over the three periods
and CEO ownership and golden parachutes do not produce any significant results.
4.3. Active managerial participation in deal negotiations
So far we have shown that higher managerial ownership, golden parachutes and equity grants
are important determinants of firms initiating their own sale. In this section, we test Hypothesis 4,
which explores further whether these incentives simply increase CEOs’ willingness to accept a deal
initiation, or whether they are also associated with CEOs’ active participation in the negotiation
process. We use the choice of the selling mechanism to test this hypothesis. We conjecture that
a positive relationship between equity incentives and target deal initiation in informal sales (ver-
sus full-scale auctions) indicates active participation of CEOs in deal negotiations because equity
incentives will be higher when CEOs are able to influence takeover outcomes, including the offer
price. The first two specifications in Table 6 focus on CEO ownership and golden parachutes and
divide the sample according to the selling mechanism: Column 1 includes deals sold in formal full-
scale auctions, while Column 2 includes only informal sales (one-to-one negotiations and controlled
sales).21 Comparing Column 1 for formal auctions with Column 2 for informal sales, we see large
differences. CEO ownership and golden parachutes do not significantly increase the probability of
target deal initiation in formal auctions, while they are significant in informal sales.22 These results
are in line with managerial motivation for active participation. Incentives matter for target deal
initiation with less formal selling mechanisms, where negotiators may potentially impact on the
overall outcome. We see evidence of managerial motivation for active participation, rather than of
bribery to accept takeovers. Neither CEO ownership nor golden parachutes increase the odds of
target initiation in deals sold in formal auctions, which leave little space for active negotiations.
- insert Table 6 about here -
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 again divide the sample into formal auctions versus informal sales,
but also include equity grants and corresponding interaction terms. Because there are several
interaction terms, it is easier to rely on the computed marginal effects of our key variables with
respect to the probability of target initiation, as reported at the bottom of the table. The results
suggest that the CEO ownership effect with equity grants comes from informal sales, as shown
in Column 4: when active CEO participation in negotiations is valuable, equity grants reinforce
the effect of CEO ownership on target initiation. The conditional marginal effect of equity grants
21Again, the selection issues do not exhibit any significant effect on the coefficient estimates. Although we run
the sample selection model for each specification, we report only standard logistic regression results.
22Indeed, positive CEO ownership is associated with a significant decrease in probability of target deal initiation
in formal auctions. For informal sales, the effect of golden parachutes is significant, conditional only on zero CEO
ownership, as in Section 4.2.
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is significant only when CEO ownership is positive. Additional equity grants to CEOs without
ownership do not significantly increase the probability of target initiation in informal sales. The
conditional marginal effects of equity grants with golden parachutes are not significant (Column
4). In formal auctions (Column 3), equity grants tend to substitute for both CEO ownership and
golden parachutes: the conditional marginal effects are positive and significant when both CEO
ownership and golden parachutes are zero. In our view, these results for formal auctions suggest
that equity grants are paid to bribe CEOs not to resist deals in the absence of CEO ownership or
golden parachutes.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 again divide the equity grants into the three periods around deal
initiation and announcement. The results show that target-initiated deal firms grant their CEOs
significantly more equity compensation between initiation and announcement only in informal
sales (Column 6), when active CEO participation in negotiations is valuable. It is possible that
the boards make implicit agreements with their CEOs, promising equity grants in preparation
for the firm sale, but start to grant them only once the selling process has definitely started. A
decision to sell a company may also be quite unexpected and therefore unplanned, due to the
unpredictability of financial distress shocks. In such situations, increased equity grants close to the
time of deal initiation are the only option. Equity grants just after deal initiation may still impact
on active CEO participation. They are awarded regardless of CEO ownership – both marginal
effects are significant and do not differ from each other. They are also significant, conditional on
positive golden parachutes, but insignificant when golden parachutes are zero. In formal auctions
(Column 5), CEOs of target-initiated deals are awarded more equity grants only after the public
announcement. This suggests that, in such cases, equity grants are not used to motivate managers
to participate actively in the deal negotiations.
4.4. Premiums
In this section, we test Hypothesis 5, that more incentivized managers in target-initiated deals
are associated with higher realized premiums. This is particularly important, given that the litera-
ture suggests that target- versus bidder-initiated deals attract lower premiums on average (Masulis
and Simsir, 2015). The premium regression in Column 1 of Table 7 includes the CEO ownership
and golden parachute dummies and their interaction terms with target initiation.23 We see that
the target initiation dummy is significantly negative, but the interaction term with CEO ownership
is positive and highly statistically significant, with the overall effect (target-initiated + CEO own-
ership x target-initiated) being statistically insignificant. Thus, CEO ownership in target-initiated
deals mitigates the negative effect of target initiation on premiums. Moreover, CEO ownership
is significantly negative, but its significantly positive interaction term with target initiation shows
that CEO ownership enhances premiums in target-initiated deals. The overall effect of CEO owner-
ship in target-initiated firms (CEO ownership + CEO ownership x target-initiated) is significantly
positive at the 5% level.
We also include a dummy variable for CEOs who keep their jobs with the merged entity for at
least two years after completion of the merger. This controls for the possibility that managers are
willing to forgo higher premiums in exchange for future jobs. We see that the dummy variable and
its interaction term with target deal initiation are not statistically significant. CEO job retention is
not associated with the premium. The coefficient remains insignificant regardless of deal initiation.
Golden parachutes have a significantly positive effect on premiums, but only for bidder-initiated
deals. Columns 2 and 3, partitioning for formal auctions and informal sales, respectively, confirm
the link between CEO motivation and active participation only for informal sales. The positive
interaction term between CEO ownership and target initiation is due to a stronger effect in informal
sales (Column 3). Interestingly, target initiation is not significant in formal auctions. Auctions
seem to lever up competition regardless of deal initiation.
23Control variables in the model are consistent with the literature (Boone and Mulherin, 2007; Masulis and Simsir,
2015). We try several specifications, but the control variables do not alter the main conclusions.
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- insert Table 7 about here -
Columns 4 to 6 explore the premium improvement effect of equity grants by including the equity
grant variable and its interaction term with target initiation. We again estimate the regression for
all deal firms, as well as separately for formal auctions and informal sales. We see that equity
grants have a significant effect on premiums only for target-initiated deals sold through informal
sales. The interaction term in Column 6 is significantly positive and the overall effect of equity
grants in target-initiated firms is also significantly positive. This suggests that equity grants to
CEOs in target-initiated deals when sold through informal sales improve takeover premiums for
their shareholders. This is not the case for bidder-initiated deals or for formal auctions.
Columns 7 to 9 consider partitioning of equity grants into three periods based on deal initiation
and public announcement dates. Again, only informal sales (Column 9) exhibit any significant
effects. The interaction term for equity grants two years before initiation is significantly positive,
while the direct effect of equity grants over this period is insignificantly negative. The overall
positive and statistically significant effect suggests that target-initiated deal firms that grant their
CEOs stock or stock options over the two years prior to deal initiation obtain higher premiums.
The overall effect of equity grants from deal initiation up to public announcement in target-initiated
deals is also significantly positive, although the interaction term is not significant. Equity grants
before public announcement seem to enhance takeover premiums, but only with target initiation
in informal sales. As a refinement of Fich et al. (2011), we show that target initiation matters
in linking equity grants to higher takeover premiums. In summary, our results strongly suggest
that CEOs are motivated to participate actively in deal negotiations when firms decide to offer
themselves for sale.
5. Conclusions
The main contribution of the paper is to show that top managers’ incentives play an important
role in decisions to initiate the sale of a company. On a sample of 1,098 publicly-listed US target
firms with completed deals over the period from 2005 to 2011, we show that target-initiated deal
firms exhibit significantly higher CEO ownership and equity grants around the initiation date. This
result is in line with the conjecture that ownership stakes motivate managers to initiate mergers
in order to preempt bankruptcy and financial distress costs. Also in line with this conjecture is
our result that higher CEO ownership is associated with a more positive relationship between firm
performance (or growth options) and target deal initiation. Notably, ownership by non-executive
directors is not a significant determinant of the initiation decision, but it reinforces the effect of
CEO ownership on the performance-initiation relationship.
Further analysis shows that CEO incentives increase the odds of target deal initiation only
in informal sales but not in formal full-scale auctions. This suggests that managerial incentives
are higher when CEOs’ active participation in takeover negotiations is more valuable. Managers
appear to be incentivized for active deal negotiations. In contrast, managerial incentives are not
significantly associated with target deal initiation in formal full-scale auctions. Auctions rely on
competition rather than skilful negotiations to maximize payoffs. Finally, we show that, when firms
offer themselves for sale, CEO incentives are indeed associated with higher takeover premiums. The
adverse selection effect on premiums is mitigated in target-initiated deal firms with higher CEO
incentives.
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Appendices
Appendix A Variable definitions
We use the following abbreviations: OC for ‘own computations’, HC for ‘hand collection’, ISS for ‘ISS
Governance Services (formerly RiskMetrics)’, TRE for ‘Thomson Reuters Eikon’ and TIF
for ‘Thomson Insider Filings’.
Variable Definition Source
Abnormal net leverage Net leverage minus optimal net leverage estimated based on
Rajan and Zingales (1995). For details on estimation of opti-
mal net leverage see its entry below.
COMPUSTAT, OC
Acquirer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the firm acquires another
firm within 3 years before the initiation date.
SDC, OC
Altman’s Z-score 1.2 * working capital/total assets + 1.4 * retained earn-
ings/total assets + 3.3 * EBIT/total assets + 0.6 * market
capitalization/book value of debt + 0.999 * total sales/total
assets. Based on Altman (1968).
COMPUSTAT, OC
Asset sale Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the firm sells a part of its
assets within 3 years before the initiation date.
SDC, OC
Asset tangibility Net plant and property divided by total assets one fiscal year
before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
Auction Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the company is sold in a
formal full-scale auction with pre-set rules and 0 otherwise.
Based on Hansen (2001).
HC
Bidders contacted The number of bidders that the target firm contacts during the
selling process.
HC
Bidder-initiated deal Deal for which, at the beginning of the selling process, a po-
tential buyer approaches the target firm and proposes an M&A
transaction.
HC
Bidders with confid. agree-
ment
The number of bidders that the target firm signs confidentiality
agreement with during the selling process.
HC
Board independence The number of independent board members (directors that are
not officers) over the total number of board members. In re-
gressions used as a dummy that is set to one in case at least
50% of board members are independent directors and zero oth-
erwise.
ISS, TRE
Board size The total number of board members. ISS, TRE
Cash offer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the acquirer offers only cash
as the payment consideration and 0 otherwise.
SDC
CEO/chair duality Dummy variable equal to 1 in case CEO of the firm is also its
chairman.
ExecuComp, TRE,
HC
CEO job retained Dummy variable equal to 1 in case CEO, who is in position
at the initiation of the deal, is retained as a manager of the
merged firm for at least 2 years after the deal resolution date.
Collected only for deal firms.
ExecuComp, TRE,
HC
CEO ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by the CEO just
before the initiation date. In Tables 4 to 7 used as a dummy
variable that is set to 1 in case CEO ownership is positive and
0 otherwise.
TIF
CEO retirement Dummy variable equal to 1 in case CEO’s age is larger than
64 and 0 otherwise. Based on Jenter and Lewellen (2015).
ExecuComp, TRE,
HC
CEO tenure before initia-
tion
The number of years since appointment to the CEO position
at the time of deal initiation. Collected only for deal firms.
ExecuComp, TRE,
HC
Controlled sale Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target company decides
to discreetly canvass a limited number of bidders that target
management believes to have a serious interest in acquiring
the company and 0 otherwise. Based on Boone and Mulherin
(2009).
HC
Debt issue Dummy variable equal to 1 in case a firm issues new debt within
3 years before the private date and 0 otherwise.
SDC
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
over total assets in the accounting year just before the initiation
date.
COMPUSTAT
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
Equity grants The total number of shares granted to the CEO in stock and
stock options as a fraction of ordinary shares outstanding over
the period from 2 years before the initiation date to the reso-
lution date.
TIF
Equity grants before initia-
tion
The total number of shares granted to the CEO in stocks and
stock options as a fraction of ordinary shares outstanding over
the period from 2 years before the initiation date to the initi-
ation date.
TIF
Equity grants after initia-
tion
The total number of shares granted to the CEO in stocks and
stock options as a fraction of ordinary shares outstanding over
the period from the initiation date to the SDC announcement
date. Based on Heitzman (2011).
TIF
Equity grants after public
announcement
The total number of shares granted to the CEO in stocks and
stock options as a fraction of ordinary shares outstanding over
the period from the SDC announcement date to the resolution
date. Based on Heitzman (2011).
TIF
Equity issue Dummy variable equal to 1 in case a firm issues equity within
3 years before the private date and 0 otherwise.
SDC
Executive ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by firms’ exec-
utives just before the initiation date.
TIF, OC
Firm age The number of years from first appearance in CRSP. Based on
Edmans et al. (2012).
CRSP, OC
Firm-specific error The first component of the decomposition by Rhodes-Kropf
et al. (2005) based on Model 1 with FF12 industries; it esti-
mates the deviation of the firm specific pricing from short-run
industry pricing.
COMPUSTAT, OC
Golden parachutes Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the CEO receives severance
pay and cash bonuses due to the termination of his/her em-
ployment after the takeover, 0 otherwise. Collected only for
deal firms.
HC
High Altman’s Z-score Dummy variable equal to 1 in case Altman’s Z-score is larger
than 2.99 and 0 otherwise. Indicator of good financial health.
COMPUSTAT, OC
Industry concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on TNIC-3 industry. Based
on Hoberg and Phillips (2016).
Hoberg-Phillips
Data Library
Industry similarity Cumulative firm-by-firm pairwise similarity score for all peers
for the firm’s TNIC-3 industry using the 10-K firm product
words. In regressions scaled by 1000. Based on Hoberg and
Phillips (2016).
Hoberg-Phillips
Data Library
Insider ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by the board
members and other officers just before the initiation date.
TIF
Institutional ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutional
blockholders just before the initiation date.
FactSet
Inst. ownership change The change in institutional ownership over one year before the
initiation date.
FactSet
Leverage Long term debt over total assets in the accounting year just
before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
Long-run value-to-book The third component of the decomposition by Rhodes-Kropf et
al (2005) based on Model 1 with FF12 industries; it measures
the deviation of the long-run value of the industry from the
book value of the firm and so measures the long-run growth
prospects of the firm.
COMPUSTAT, OC
Low Altman’s Z-score Dummy variable equal to 1 in case Altman’s Z-score is smaller
than 1.81 and 0 otherwise. Indicator of financial distress.
COMPUSTAT, OC
Low interest coverage Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the interest coverage ratio
(EBIT over interest payment due in the accounting year just
before the initiation date) is smaller than 2 and 0 otherwise.
COMPUSTAT
M&A activity The total number of firms with a takeover in the same first
three-digit SIC code as the sample firm over one year just be-
fore the initiation date divided by the total number of firms
in the same first three-digit SIC code in COMPUSTAT. Based
on Schlingemann et al. (2002).
COMPUSTAT,
SDC, OC
Market-to-book ratio Market capitalization over the book value of equity in the ac-
counting year just before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
Market capitalization Stock price times shares outstanding on the initiation date. CRSP
Net leverage Long term debt minus cash and marketable securities over total
assets in the accounting year just before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
Non-executive ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by indepen-
dent directors just before the initiation date. In some regres-
sions used as a dummy variable that is set to one in case non-
executive ownership is positive and zero otherwise.
TIF, OC
Optimal net leverage -0.346 + 0.562 × asset tangibility – 0.001 × M/B + 0.042
× ln(total sales) – 0.071 × EBITDA, where M/B is market
capitalization plus book value of debt over total assets. The
model is estimated based on all firms in COMPUSTAT over
the period 1950-2015. Firm fixed effects and year dummies
are included in the estimation. Based on Rajan and Zingales
(1995).
COMPUSTAT, OC
Past abnormal return Raw buy and hold stock return over 1 year before the initiation
date adjusted by the equally weighted market return over the
same period.
CRSP, Eventus, OC
Past raw return Raw buy and hold stock return over 1 year before the initiation
date.
CRSP, Eventus
Premium The final offer price relative to the stock price 8 weeks before
the SDC announcement date in percentage points.
SDC
Private equity acquirer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case a firm is acquired by a
private equity investor and 0 otherwise. Based on Fidrmuc et
al. (2012).
SDC
Private negotiation Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the company is sold in
a privately negotiated sale with one bidder and 0 otherwise.
Based on Boone and Mulherin (2009).
HC
Private selling process
length
Length in days from the initiation date to the SDC announce-
ment date.
HC
Public acquirer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the company is acquired by
a public firm and 0 otherwise.
SDC
Pubic selling process length Length in days from the SDC announcement date to the reso-
lution date.
HC
R&D ratio Research and development expenses over total assets in the
accounting year just before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
SA index -0.737 * size + 0.043 * size2 – 0.04 * age, where size is the
natural log of inflation adjusted (to USD 2004) book value of
total assets and age is the number of years the firm has been on
COMPUSTAT with a non-missing stock price. We winsorize
size from the top at ln4500 and age at 37. Based on Hadlock
and Pierce (2010).
COMPUSTAT, OC
Sector error The second component of the decomposition by Rhodes-Kropf
et al. (2005) based on Model 1 with FF12 industries; it es-
timates the deviation between the short-run versus long-run
pricing of the firm’s industry.
COMPUSTAT, OC
Selling process length The length in days from the initiation to resolution date. HC
Takeover defenses Dummy variable equal to 1 for targets incorporated in
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wisconsin that have
strong takeover impediments and 0 otherwise. Based on Be-
bchuk et al. (2002).
SDC
Target-initiated deal The board of the target firm decides to sell the company and
consequently contacts potential buyers.
HC
Third-party initiated deal Bidder initiated deal that ends up with a buyer that is not the
primary initiator of the deal.
HC
Total assets Book value of total assets. In the analysis used as a natural
log of USD millions.
COMPUSTAT
Total sales The sum collected for providing goods and services. COMPUSTAT
Transaction value Total value paid by the acquirer less fees and expenses. SDC
Years job retained The number of years the CEO, who is in position at the initia-
tion of the deal, is retained as a manager of the merged entity
after the deal resolution date. Collected only for deal firms.
ExecuComp, TRE,
HC
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Appendix B Initiation coding example
B.1 Applebees International: a target-initiated deal
The following paragraph from the SEC filing of Applebees International Inc. describes the ini-
tial decision: ”Our Board held its annual strategic retreat on August 23-25, 2006. . . . The strategic
alternatives discussion focused on two potential alternatives: (1) a leveraged recapitalization involv-
ing an expanded share repurchase program that would involve increasing the total debt to EBITDA
leverage ratio to approximately three times and (2) a confidential market test for a possible sale of
the company.” The text shows that Applebees took the initiative and started considering a poten-
tial sale as a way forward for the company. We code the deal as target-initiated and August 23,
2006 as the initiation date. Applebees also retained financial advisors to solicit potential merger
candidates.
The following section of the filing indicates that the number of bidders contacted is 35 and the
number of bidders with confidentiality agreements is 26. ”During the next several weeks and in
accordance with the Committee’s instructions, Citi and Banc of America Securities contacted 35
potential purchasers of Applebee’s. . . . Twenty-six potential purchasers executed a confidentiality
agreement and received an offering memorandum with non-public information during the week of
March 18, 2007.”
Applebee’s was sold in an auction, as documented in the following text: ”On April 14, 2007,
Citi and Banc of America Securities informed the Committee that we received four preliminary
indications of interest in purchasing our company. . . . Five other potential bidders asked for addi-
tional time to submit an indication of interest . . . As is typical, these indications of interest were
non-binding and contained numerous conditions, including due diligence conditions. . . . After re-
viewing the initial indications of interest with Citi’s assistance, the Committee decided to allow
these four bidders, including IHOP, to continue to the next phase of the sale process which involved
more detailed due diligence, including access to a data room and participation in multi-day man-
agement presentations. . . . This conclusion was driven in large part by the fact that at that point in
time the contemplated deadline for final submission of bids was shortly before the date of Applebee’s
annual meeting . . . During April and May, all four remaining potential bidders continued their due
diligence activities. In addition, all four received a draft merger agreement and were asked to submit
final, definitive offers, including a proposed contract, by June 11. ”
B.2 AirTran Holdings: a bidder-initiated deal
In this case, we code the initiation based on the following section from the SEC filing of Air-
Tran Holdings Inc: ”On April 21, 2010, Gary Kelly, Southwest’s Chairman, President and CEO,
telephoned Robert L. Fornaro, AirTran’s Chairman, President and CEO, and asked Mr. Fornaro
if he would meet with him in person to discuss a potential business matter, without indicating the
specific nature of the matter. On May 6, 2010, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Fornaro met in a suburb of
Dallas, Texas, and Mr. Kelly asked Mr. Fornaro if AirTran would be open to discussions regarding
an acquisition by Southwest. Mr. Fornaro replied that he believed that management of AirTran had
a duty to consider any adequately priced and financed acquisition offer and should such an offer be
forthcoming from Southwest, management of AirTran would so consider it.” Since it was Sothwest’s
Chairman who solicited potential merger candidates for the company, the deal as bidder-initiated.
The initiation date is May 6, 2010.
AirTran was sold in a private negotiation, which can be implied from the following lengthy
process: ”Following Southwest’s and its advisors’ evaluation of AirTran, Southwest determined to
propose to AirTran that Southwest commence a preliminary due diligence investigation of AirTran.
. . . AirTran directed its counsel to establish an electronic data room for various documents to be
made available to Southwest in connection with this due diligence. . . . During the next three weeks,
Southwest conducted its preliminary due diligence investigation of AirTran. . . . On July 31, 2010,
AirTran’s senior management held a conference call with Morgan Stanley and Smith Gambrell
to review and discuss the proposal received from Southwest and related matters. . . . On August
13, 2010, Vinson&Elkins distributed an initial draft of a merger agreement to AirTran and its
20
representatives. . . . On August 27, 2010, Vinson&Elkins distributed a revised draft of the merger
agreement to AirTran and its representatives, which reflected Southwest’s responses to the AirTran
comments received on August 21, 2010. . . . On September 4, 2010, Vinson&Elkins distributed a
revised draft of the merger agreement in response to the discussions between the parties. . . . Also
on September 23, 2010, Vinson&Elkins sent a revised draft of the merger agreement to AirTran
and its representatives reflecting all discussions between the parties on open items up to that date.
. . . The merger agreement was executed on behalf of Southwest and AirTran shortly after conclusion
of the respective September 26, 2010 meetings of the AirTran and Southwest boards of directors.
The merger was publicly announced in the early morning of September 27, 2010.” In a private
negotiation, the number of bidders contacted and signing confidentiality agreements are both one.
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Table 1: Selling-process summary statistics.
This table presents summary statistics for hand collected target- (487) and bidder-initiated (611) deals. All variables are
defined in Appendix A and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except all dummy variables. We test for differences
in means using the t-test allowing for unequal variances and in medians using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank sum
test. The significance of differences in means (medians) between target- versus bidder-initiated deals is indicated in the
mean (median) column for bidder-initiated deals. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent level.
Target-initiated deals Bidder-initiated deals
Mean Median St. dev Mean Median St.dev
Transaction value(million USD) 1,409 286 3,973 2,165a 509a 4,992
Premium 26.6% 27.0% 58.2% 39.0%a 34.0%a 45.2%
Third-party initiated 0 0 0 0.39 0 0.49
Auction 0.50 1 0.50 0.20a 0a 0.40
Controlled sale 0.36 0 0.48 0.38 0 0.49
Private negotiation 0.14 0 0.34 0.42a 0a 0.49
Private selling process length 478 342 409 314a 220a 333
Public selling process length 117 103 67 127b 104 83
Selling process length 595 464 407 441a 350a 342
Bidders contacted 30 14 43 9a 2a 18
Bidders with confid. agreement 11 4 17 4a 1a 8
Private equity acquirer 0.26 0 0.44 0.23 0 0.42
Public acquirer 0.65 1 0.48 0.71b 1b 0.46
Cash offer 0.68 1 0.47 0.71 1 0.45
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Table 5: Analysis of factors influencing the likelihood of target deal initiation: equity grants and golden
parachutes.
This table reports estimation results for logistic models with the dependent variable equal to 1 for all target-initiated
and 0 for bidder-initiated deals. The data set covers 487 target-initiated and 611 bidder-initiated deals. We report
Hubert/White robust standard errors in brackets. Based on Powers (2005), for several variables of interest, we also
report their average or conditional marginal effects on target-initiation probability at the bottom of the table. In Column
5, we partition ‘equity grants’ into ‘EG before initiation’, ‘EG after initiation’ and ‘EG after public announcement’ and
find that only the coefficient for ‘EG after initiation’ is significant. To preserve space, Column 5 reports ‘EG after
initiation’ under the label of ‘Equity grants’ and does not report the other two EG coefficients. All variables are defined
in Appendix A and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for all dummy variables. Both year and
industry dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-, five-
and ten-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.882c -1.019b -1.198b -1.320a -1.370a
(0.460) (0.461) (0.485) (0.483) (0.486)
CEO ownership 0.299b 0.613a 0.248c 0.532b 0.527b
(0.141) (0.214) (0.143) (0.238) (0.217)
Golden parachutes 0.097 0.392c 0.110 0.399c 0.364c
(0.141) (0.205) (0.141) (0.220) (0.206)
Golden parachutes x CEO ownership -0.543b -0.552b -0.519c
(0.276) (0.279) (0.278)
Equity grants 8.900a 7.453 35.151a
(3.105) (4.608) (11.506)
Equity grants x CEO ownership 2.386
(6.298)
Equity grants x golden parachutes 0.559
(6.400)
Non-exec. ownership 0.937 0.868 0.804 0.736 0.606
(0.897) (0.902) (0.885) (0.886) (0.886)
Institutional ownership -0.859a -0.850a -0.804a -0.787a -0.855a
(0.283) (0.282) (0.286) (0.286) (0.285)
Inst. ownership change 0.777 0.881 0.761 0.870 0.990
(0.920) (0.920) (0.916) (0.914) (0.930)
Total assets -0.081 -0.086 -0.062 -0.068 -0.062
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
# observations 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005
χ2 81.55a 82.43a 87.34a 87.25a 84.67a
Average marginal effect on target initiation probability
CEO ownership 0.067b 0.067b 0.055c 0.055c 0.050
Golden parachutes 0.022 0.019 0.025 0.022 0.016
Equity grants 1.995a 2.035a 7.812a
Conditional marginal effect on target initiation probability
Golden parachutes | CEO ownership = 1 -0.034 -0.033 -0.035
Golden parachutes | CEO ownership = 0 0.086c 0.090b 0.080c
Difference -0.121b -0.122b -0.114c
Equity grants | CEO ownership = 1 2.284b
Equity grants | CEO ownership = 0 1.722
Difference 0.562
Equity grants | Golden parachutes = 1 2.100c
Equity grants | Golden parachutes = 0 1.945b
Difference 0.155
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Table 6: Analysis of factors influencing the likelihood of target deal initiation: active CEO participation.
This table reports estimation results for logistic models with the dependent variable equal 1 for all target-initiated
deals and 0 for bidder-initiated deals. The data covers 487 target-initiated and 611 bidder-initiated deals. We report
Hubert/White robust standard errors in brackets. Based on Powers (2005), for several variables of interest, we also report
their average or conditional marginal effects on target-initiation probability at the bottom of the table. All variables are
defined in Appendix A and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for all dummy variables. Both year
and industry dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at the one-,
five- and ten-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Auction Inf.sale Auction Inf.sale Auction Inf.sale
Constant -1.712b -1.336b -1.840b -0.838 -1.805c -1.070c
(0.868) (0.594) (0.887) (0.561) (0.929) (0.587)
CEO ownership -0.204 0.837a -0.095 0.721b 0.116 0.709b
(0.424) (0.281) (0.472) (0.307) (0.488) (0.326)
Golden parachutes 0.169 0.550b 0.246 0.464c 0.238 0.499c
(0.425) (0.264) (0.441) (0.278) (0.462) (0.283)
GP x CEO ownership -0.452 -0.654c -0.396 -0.716b -0.498 -0.758b
(0.554) (0.361) (0.566) (0.363) (0.575) (0.373)
Equity grants 24.045c 0.557
(13.915) (8.060)
EG x CEO ownership -12.860 9.570
(13.382) (9.258)
EG x GP -6.585 3.359
(11.003) (9.108)
EG b.initiation 26.051 4.388
(25.425) (10.801)
EG a.initiation 22.680 42.142
(34.961) (31.211)
EG a.public ann. 366.319a -176.611
(140.930) (113.825)
EG b.ini. x CEO ow. -24.645 3.888
(20.655) (13.601)
EG a.ini. x CEO ow. -2.752 -15.530
(35.214) (36.611)
EG a.pub.ann. x CEO ow. -417.674a 219.684c
(144.530) (125.732)
EG b.ini. x GP -6.840 -6.126
(20.366) (13.483)
EG a.ini. x GP -3.987 24.432
(32.167) (32.409)
EG a.pub.ann. x GP 86.832 34.773
(93.550) (88.576)
Non-exec. ownership 2.509 0.524 2.406 0.363 2.412 0.198
(2.127) (1.073) (2.227) (1.033) (2.165) (1.056)
Institutional ownership -1.521b -0.816b -1.457b -0.802b -1.502b -0.860b
(0.573) (0.385) (0.586) (0.388) (0.583) (0.396)
Inst. ownership change 1.958 0.644 1.986 0.613 2.031 0.964
(1.810) (1.128) (1.847) (1.097) (1.875) (1.156)
Total assets 0.248b -0.090 0.286b -0.075 0.277b -0.055
(0.122) (0.072) (0.126) (0.073) (0.129) (0.075)
# observations 331 674 331 674 331 674
χ2 38.59c 73.96a 40.96c 72.02a 46.55c 76.61a
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Auction Inf.sale Auction Inf.sale Auction Inf.sale
Average marginal effect on target initiation probability
CEO ownership -0.090c 0.089b -0.099b 0.087b -0.098b 0.071c
Golden parachutes -0.020 0.035 -0.019 0.021 -0.020 0.020
Equity grants 2.286b 1.544c
Equity grants b.initiation 1.265 0.581
Equity grants a.initiation 3.472 9.065a
Equity grants a.pub.ann. 30.514b -5.911
Conditional marginal effect on target initiation probability
GP | CEO ow.= 1 -0.056 -0.022 -0.053 -0.042 -0.057 -0.043
GP | CEO ow.= 0 0.030 0.098b 0.026 0.093c 0.028 0.095b
Difference -0.086 -0.120c -0.079 -0.135c -0.086 -0.139c
EG | CEO ow.= 1 1.412 2.466b
EG | CEO ow.= 0 3.398c 0.477
Difference -1.986 1.989
EG | GP = 1 1.795 1.820
EG | GP = 0 3.023c 1.197
Difference -1.228 0.623
EG b.ini. | CEO ow.= 1 -0.547 0.989
EG b.ini. | CEO ow.= 0 3.649 0.120
Difference -4.196 0.869
EG a.ini. | CEO ow.= 1 3.450 8.162b
EG a.ini. | CEO ow.= 0 3.370 10.265c
Difference 0.080 -2.104
EG a.pub.ann. | CEO ow.= 1 0.333 12.671
EG a.pub.ann. | CEO ow.= 0 69.202a -28.013
Difference -68.869a 40.684c
EG b.ini. | GP = 1 0.721 0.076
EG b.ini. | GP = 0 2.079 1.268
Difference -1.358 -1.192
EG a.ini. | GP = 1 3.194 11.326b
EG a.ini. | GP = 0 3.877 6.175
Difference -0.683 5.152
EG a.pub.ann. | GP = 1 36.220b -4.235
EG a.pub.ann. | GP = 0 21.369c -8.334
Difference 14.851 4.099
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